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Abstract 
There has been a great deal written about the relationship between sharia law and 
international human rights law, particularly with regards to the treatment of women. 
The tensions between sharia law and international law norms of equality and non-
discrimination have been well documented, and the possibilities for interpreting sharia 
law in a manner that accords with international human rights law have been insightfully 
explored by scholars of human rights and Islamic law. It has been shown that Islam is 
a religion of peace, tolerance, justice and equality. It has been said that the Qur’anic 
passages describing the role of women should be understood in the context in which 
they were written, which was a time in history in which women were seen as vastly 
inferior to men in almost every society throughout the world, particularly in the Arabian 
peninsula. Read in this context, it is argued, Islam must be seen as an advocate for 
gender equality, and should thus be interpreted as standing for gender equality today. 
This paper argues that, while this may indeed be the preferred interpretation of Islam, 
this is of little assistance to women in countries such as Sudan whose national 
legislation enshrines and enforces the most discriminatory aspects of sharia law. 
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1. Introduction 
The tensions between sharia law and international law norms of equality and 
non-discrimination have been well documented, and the possibilities for 
interpreting sharia law in a manner that accords with international human rights 
law have been extensively debated.1 It has been shown that Islam is a religion of 
peace, tolerance, justice and equality. It has been said that the Qur’anic passages 
describing the role of women should be understood in the context in which 
they were written, and that as such, Islam must be seen as an advocate for 
gender equality. This paper argues that while this may indeed be the preferred 
interpretation of Islam, this is of little assistance to women in countries whose 
national legislation enshrines and enforces the most discriminatory aspects of 
sharia law. Using Sudan as a case study, this paper explores the way in which sharia 
law is reflected and applied in national legislation, explores the link between the 
application of sharia law and the existence of inequality between women and men, 
and discusses the implications of gender inequality – and the violence that is 
often associated with inequality – both for development and for peace. 
This paper commences with a brief outline of the principles enshrined 
in international human rights law regarding the right to equality and  
non-discrimination – because these principles set the standard against which the 
treatment of women under classical sharia2 must be compared. Part 2 highlights 
some specific aspects of sharia law which, on a classical reading of the sources, 
violate international human rights law and contribute to an environment in 
which women are subordinated and violence is condoned, while part 3 considers 
the way in which these discriminatory aspects are reflected in national legislation 
in Sudan. Part 4 discusses the varying degrees to which sharia law has been 
incorporated into national legal systems across the Islamic world, and considers 
the way in which this is manifested in disparities between the basic capabilities 
of women and men, with significant implications for development. Part 5 
explores the extent to which cultural norms of violence and subordination –such 
as can be found in traditional interpretations of sharia law– affect the likelihood 
of a state either engaging in conflict or achieving sustainable peace. 
 
1 . For examples of Islamic scholarship that seek to reinterpret sharia law in a manner compatible with 
international human rights law, see: eg, Mayer, 3rd ed, 1999; Baderin, 2003. 
2. The term ‘classical sharia law’ means a strict reading of the primary sources of sharia law - the Qur’an and 
the sunna (the words, or the teachings) of the Prophet. Throughout this paper I have adopted the definition of 
sharia used by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im. An-Na’im defines sharia as including ‘ethical and social norms, 
political and constitutional theory, and so forth, as well as codes of private, public, penal and commercial 
law,’ and as referring specifically to ‘historical formulations of this comprehensive system’ rather than ‘possible 
re-formulations of a modern Islamic legal system’, See: An-Na’im, in Lindholm and Vogt (ed), 1992: 135. 
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2. Women’s Rights in International Law 
The most important statement of women’s rights in international law is the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW).1 CEDAW defines discrimination against women and sets a 
framework for national action to bring an end to such discrimination, and as 
such has become a critical tool in addressing discrimination against women 
and girls around the world. Art 15 provides that parties to the convention ‘shall 
accord to women equality with men before the law,’ and ‘in civil matters, a 
legal capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise 
that capacity’ and ‘shall treat [women] equally in all stages of procedure in 
courts and tribunals.’ (CEDAW, art 15) Art 16 requires complete equality 
between men and women in all matters relating to marriage and family 
relations during marriage and upon its dissolution. (CEDAW, art 16) 
While CEDAW is the only international treaty to comprehensively address 
the fundamental rights of women in political, social, cultural, economic,  
legal and family life, both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) contain important provisions regarding equality 
and non-discrimination. The ICCPR and the ICESCR both provide that state 
parties will ensure the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of 
all of the rights set forth in the respective Covenant.2 The ICCPR obliges 
state parties to respect and ensure the equality of men and women before the 
law and the equal protection of men and women by the law,3 the equality 
of men and women before courts and tribunals,4 and the equal enjoyment 
by men and women of the right to liberty of movement.5 The ICCPR also 
provides that state parties will take appropriate steps to ensure equality of 
rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at 
its dissolution.6 The ICESCR obligates state parties to take steps to ensure 
the progressive realization of the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain 
 
1. See: Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 18 December 
1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force on 3 September 1981). 
2. See: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171, art 3 (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 3, art 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
3. See: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171, art 26 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
4. See: ICCPR art 14. 
5. See: ICCPR art 12. 
6. See: ICCPR art 23(4). 
250   Human Rights/ Vol. 14/ No.2/ Issue 28/ pp. 221-245 
a living by work which he or she freely chooses or accepts.1 
In addition to the rights specified in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, all states 
are arguably bound by the international law norms of equality before the law 
and non-discrimination in the application of the law – on the ground that these 
principles have obtained the status of customary international law.2 These 
principles are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which states that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights,3 that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in 
the Universal Declaration without distinction of any kind, including 
discrimination on the grounds of sex,4 and that all are equal before the law and 
are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.5 
There is a strong argument that all of the rights set forth in the UDHR have 
acquired the status of customary international law, and are thus binding on all 
states irrespective of their membership of treaty regimes.6 While some argue 
that this statement goes too far, the principles of non-discrimination, equality 
before the law and equal protection by the law are widely accepted as having 
acquired the status of customary international law.7 Thus, all states – 
irrespective of their treaty obligations – have the obligation to respect, protect 
and ensure enjoyment of these rights. 
Notably missing from CEDAW and the international human rights covenants 
is an explicit statement that violence against women is a human rights violation. 
In 1993 the UN General Assembly went some way towards rectifying this 
omission, with the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women.8 The Declaration affirms that ‘violence against women 
constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women’ 
(CEDAW) and recognizes that ‘violence against women is one of the crucial 
 
1. See: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 3, art 6 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
2. See: Lillich, 1984: 115, 133 and McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, 1980: 564. An extensive list of authorities in 
support of the international law ‘norm of non-discrimination’ is provided by McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, 
1980: 567. 
3. See:Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), art 1, UN Doc A/810/71 (1948). 
4. See: UDHR, art 2. 
5. See: UDHR, art 7. 
6. See, eg, Sohn, 1982: 32. Pohl, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran, UN ESCOR, CHR, 43rd Sess, 
Provisional Agenda Item 12, [4 - 5], UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/23 (1987); McKean, 1983: 274; McDougal, 
Lasswell and Chen, 1980: 272. 
7. See: Lillich, 1984, McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, 1980: 564. 
8. See: Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, GA Res 48/104, 48th Sess, Agenda Item 
111, UN GAOR, UN Doc A/Res/48/104 (1993). 
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social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position 
compared with men’. (CEDAW) Violence against women and girls is 
fundamentally disempowering, inhibits the enjoyment of the most basic human 
rights, and causes women and girls around the world to live in a climate of fear 
and shame. It is widely recognized as being the most pervasive human rights 
violation in the world today.1 This paper considers the religio-legal basis of 
inequalities between women and men and of violence against women, and the 
relevance of sharia law in this regard. 
3. Inequality and Discrimination in Sharia Law 
This section highlights selected aspects of classical sharia law which violate 
most demonstrably the fundamental human rights of women, and which 
contravene the international law norms of equality and non-discrimination. 
The aspects of sharia law considered here are the value of a woman’s 
testimony, the rights of women in marriage and restrictions on a woman’s 
freedom to leave the family home. It will be suggested in the remainder of this 
paper that each of these aspects of sharia, as incorporated into domestic 
legislation in Islamic states (using Sudan as an example) plays a critical role in 
sustaining and entrenching an environment in which women are in a 
subordinate position relative to men, in which violence against women is seen 
as a legitimate means of addressing grievances, and in which women are 
prevented from exercising their economic, social and cultural rights. 
3.1. A The Value of a Woman’s Testimony 
One aspect of sharia that most violates the principle of equality between men and 
women, and specifically the principle of equality before the law, is the Qur’anic 
principle that the testimony of a woman is worth half that of a man. The clearest 
statement of this principle is found in Sura 2 Verse 282 of the Qur’an: 
Whenever you give or take credit for a stated term, set it down in 
writing … And call upon two of your men to act as witnesses; and if 
two men are not available, then a man and two women from among such 
as are acceptable to you as witnesses, so that if one of them should 
make a mistake, the other could remind her. (Asad, 1984: 63) 
Much has been written about the value of a woman’s testimony in sharia law, 
 
1. See: Bunch, ‘The Intolerable Status Quo: Violence against Women and Girls,’ The Progress of nations 1997 
<http://www.unicef.org/pon97/40-49.pdf> at 25 June 2007. 
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and the reason for the differentiation between men and women in this regard. 
A number of explanations have been offered, including the fact that women 
were, in the time of the Prophet, ‘less familiar with business procedures than 
men, and, therefore, more liable to commit mistakes in this respect’. (Asad, 
1984: 63) While the testimony of a woman is acceptable in non-criminal 
matters, provided that it is confirmed by the testimony of another woman and 
a man,1 classical Islamic jurisprudence provides that ‘in the time of the Prophet 
and his two immediate successors it was an invariable rule to exclude the 
evidence of women in all cases inducing punishment or retaliation’ (al-
Marghinani, 1982: 353) – that is, in criminal cases. The lack of value accorded 
to a woman’s testimony is not only significant insofar as it makes a statement 
about the relative value of men and women, but –as will be shown below– it 
creates a situation in which certain crimes, such as rape, are rendered almost 
impossible to prove. This has been an important factor in creating a climate of 
virtual impunity for these crimes. 
3.2. Women’s Rights in Marriage and in the Family 
On no other topic does sharia speak with such clarity about the rights and 
duties of men and women as it does on marital and family relations. It is  
an area in which, as noted by Islamic law scholar Lisa Hajjar, ‘[t]here is 
strong and pervasive opposition to the notion that men and women should be 
equal … [and a] belief that domestic relationships are legitimately … 
hierarchical’. (Hajjar, 2004: 29) 
The most often cited description of the hierarchical marital relationship, and 
of the behaviour expected of husbands and wives, is found in Sura 4 verse 34 
of the Qur’an: 
Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has 
given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support 
them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly 
obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have 
them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty 
and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (Next), refuse to share their 
beds, (And last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, 
 
1. See: al-Marghinani, 1982: 353; An-Na’im in Lindholm and Vogt (ed), 1992: 145. Although it is generally 
agreed that the testimony of women may be accepted in all non-criminal matters, there is support in the hadith 
literature for the proposition that a woman’s testimony should never be accepted in matters of marriage and 
divorce. See, for eg, Anas, 1989: 297. 
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seek not against them Means (of annoyance) …1 (Ali, 1938: 190) 
While a number of Islamic law scholars argue that the emergence of sharia 
law in the early seventh century improved the position of women,2 that the 
Qur’an accords equality to men and women (in dignity if not in rights),3 and 
that the reference to ‘lightly’ beating wives was intended only to restrict what 
was an already common practice,4 dominant interpretations of sharia accept 
the following as basic tenets of the marital relationship: male authority or 
responsibility over women (qawwama),5 a woman’s duty of obedience (ta’a) 
to her husband, and a man’s right (albeit a restricted one) to physically 
discipline his wife.6 It will be suggested below that, in the case of Sudan and 
elsewhere, these basic principles permeate marital relations and family life, 
justify and condone domestic violence, and – because domestic violence is 
rarely seen to be a crime – ultimately bar women from accessing the formal 
criminal justice system and thus contribute to impunity for these crimes. 
3.3. A Woman’s Freedom to Leave the Marital Home 
Another aspect of sharia that denies women the rights accorded to them by 
international law, and specifically the right to liberty of movement, is the 
doctrine that women do not have unrestricted rights of movement outside the 
marital home.7 One hadith which speaks particularly strongly in support of this 
doctrine provides as follows: 
‘Oh Messenger of God, what is a wife’s obligation towards her husband’. 
Muhammed said: ‘Her obligation is that she does not go out of her 
house except by permission, and if she does, God, the Angels of mercy, 
and the Angels of anger will curse her until she repents or until she 
 
1. With regards to the type of beating that is permitted by the Qur’an, Sahih al-Bukhari states ‘beat them (lightly 
your wives, if it is useful) ie, without causing them severe pain’: Bukhari, 1976: 100. 
2. See: Nawaz, 1965: 328; Al-Hibri, 2001: 37, 47. 
3. See: al-Hibri, 2001: 46; Badawi, 1995: 4. 
4. See: al-Hibri, 2001: 60; Hajjar, 2004: 11 (‘the notion that beating constitutes a right available to men certainly 
contradicts the Qur’anic ideal of marital relations as companionable and mutually supportive.’) The approach 
taken by al-Hibri and Hajjar is supported by a hadith found in the collection of Maulana Muhammad Ali, 
which states that ‘the best of you are the kindest of you to their wives’: Tirmidhi 10:11, in Ali, 1945: 377. 
5. See: Roald, 2001: 149. The interpretation of the word qawwamun as meaning man’s authority over women is 
contested by some scholars of Islam. See, eg, al-Hibri: 2001, who notes that the word is translated as 
protectors and maintainers, and that ‘[a]ncient Arabic dictionaries ... include among the meanings of 
“qawwamun” those of guiding and advising’ and that ‘[t]hese meanings are more consistent with the general 
Qur’anic view of gender relations than the one preferred by male jurists’: at 51. 
6. See: Roald, 2001: 149. 
7. See: generally, Pearl and Menski, 1998: 178. 
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comes back’. She said: ‘And if he oppresses her?’ Muhammad said: 
‘Even if he oppresses her’. (az-Zuhaili, 2001: 336; Roald, 2001: 147) 
This hadith has been interpreted by Az-Zuhaili to mean that ‘[t]he woman is 
not to go out of her house even to perform Hajj, except with the permission of 
her husband. And he [the husband] has the right to prevent her from going to 
the mosque and other places…’  (az-Zuhaili, 2001: 34, Roald, 2001: 147) 
Az-Zuhaili’s reliance on this hadith is criticized by Ann Sophie Roald, who 
argues that the hadith does not appear in ‘any of the important hadith collections,’ 
and that Az-Zuhaili’s use of the hadith is ‘an outstanding example of a person’s 
ability to select those texts which are compatible with his/her own view on a 
non-verbalised level’.1 While Roald may be correct in questioning the authenticity 
of the hadith, the understanding that a women is not entitled to leave the marital 
home without her husband’s consent, and the corollary to this –that a man may 
take disciplinary action when this is violated– is a critical component of a 
social, cultural and legal environment in which women are prevented from 
freely exercising basic human rights (such as the right to work), and as such 
from freely engaging in economic, political or social activity. 
4. The Role of the State in the Formalisation of Sharia Law: Sudan, 
a Case Study 
It has been shown above that there is a significant gap between the fundamental 
human rights accorded to women under international law, and the rights 
accorded by classical sharia law. The following section considers the extent to 
which this gap is reflected in current legislation in Sudan. As applied in the 
laws of Sudan, sharia law denies women the basic human rights accorded to 
men, and entrenches an environment in which women must live with the 
knowledge that a challenge to the established order –particularly as regards 
family relations– may result in their being subjected to violence. 
While sharia law is critically important in explaining gender relations in 
Muslim societies, the existence of sharia cannot by itself explain the problem 
of inequality and violence. While there are considerable similarities in gender 
and family relations throughout Muslim societies, there are also variations in 
 
1. See: Roald, 2001: 147. As is the case with much of the hadith literature, hadiths can also be found to support 
the contrary view (that women are permitted to leave the home). One hadith contained in the collection of 
Bukhari, 1976, for eg, states that ‘[o]nce Sauda bint Zam’a went out at night for some need, and Umar saw 
her, and recognizing her, he said (to her) “By Allah, O Sauda! You cannot hide yourself from us”. So she 
returned to the Prophet and mentioned that to him … [and he said]: “O women! You have been allowed by 
Allah to go out for your needs”’: at 120. 
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the way in which sharia is interpreted and applied at the state level. The most 
important variable in explaining these differences is the state itself. It is the 
state that formalizes and regulates gender relations through the law, and it is 
the state alone that is formally “vested with the responsibility to prohibit and 
punish violence”. (Hajjar, 2004: 5) It is therefore important to consider the role 
played by the state in the interpretation and application of sharia law, and the 
way in which the principles of sharia law are reflected in the national 
legislative regime. 
The formal legal system in Sudan is comprised of the Constitution (which 
came into force after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
2005) and national legislation which “has as its sources Sharia law and the 
consensus of the people”. (Interim National Constitution of the Republic of 
Sudan 2005) The current government came to power following a coup in 1989, 
committed to Islamization, fundamentalism and to the consolidation of a 
legislative regime based on sharia law.1 The principles of sharia are today reflected 
in a range of legislative instruments including the Criminal Act 1991, the Evidence 
Act 1993 and the Muslim Personal Matters Act 1991. This section discusses each 
of these Acts, with a focus on their sources in sharia law, their compatibility with 
international human rights law and their discriminatory impact upon women. 
The Criminal Act 1991 aims to observe ‘sharia as the main source of legislation, 
so that its spirit shall infiltrate into the Act and its principles intermingle with 
the provisions thereof, and its guidance manifest itself in the added or omitted 
provisions’. When read together with the Evidence Act 1993, the Criminal Act 
1991 has an enormously disproportionate impact upon women, and arguably 
plays a greater role than any other single legal instrument in creating an 
environment of impunity for violence against women (particularly rape and 
sexual violence) in Sudan. 
In line with the principles of sharia, the Criminal Act 1991 accords special 
status to six types of crime referred to as hudud offences: capital theft, armed 
robbery, false accusation of unchastity, apostasy, drinking alcohol, and 
adultery.2 Hudud offences are distinguished in a number of important ways 
from other offences. Among other distinctions, the restriction on the death 
penalty to offenders over the age of 18 years does not apply to hudud offences,3 
 
1. For a more detailed background and discussion of the ‘Islamization’ of the Sudanese legal system see: 
An-Na’im, in Lindholm and Vogt (ed), 1992: 138 - 140. 
2. See: Criminal Act 1991 s 3. 
3. See: Criminal Act 1991 s 27(2). 
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meaning that any ‘adult’ (aged 15 and above) 1 can be subject to the death penalty 
for the commission of a hudud offence. 
The discriminatory way in which women are positioned within the Criminal 
Act 1991, and particularly in relation to the hudud offences, can only be fully 
understood when the legislation is read in conjunction with the Evidence Act 
1993 – also with its sources in sharia law. Section 63 of the Evidence Act 
provides that, with the exception of adultery, all hudud offences shall be 
proved either by a confession before a court, or by the testimony of two men, 
or ‘when necessary’ by the testimony of a man and two women or the 
testimony of four women.2 This provision, with its foundation in sharia law, is 
one of the aspects of Sudanese national legislation that most blatantly violates 
the principle of equality before the law enshrined in the UDHR and the 
ICCPR.3 It also violates the guarantee in section 31 of the Constitution of 
Sudan that all persons are equal before the law.4 
In the case of adultery, the Evidence Act 1993 requires that the offence shall 
be proved either by express confession before a court, or by the testimony of 
four adult men, or by the pregnancy of an unmarried woman.5 This is in 
accordance with the Islamic law doctrine, discussed above, that ‘the testimony 
of women is not accepted in accusations involving hadd punishments’.6 
(Malik, 1989: 297 (and accompanying discussion)) This requirement means 
that while it is almost impossible to prove a man guilty of adultery, an 
unmarried woman who falls pregnant may in the absence of any witnesses be 
found guilty and convicted of the crime. An unmarried woman who finds 
herself in these circumstances has, as her only defence, the crime of rape. Yet 
while her pregnancy alone is sufficient to establish her guilt of adultery, she 
 
1. See: Criminal Act 1991 s 3. 
2. See: Evidence Act 1993 s 63. Note that this section of the Act arguably does not comply with a strict 
interpretation of sharia law, which as discussed above, does not allow the testimony of women in criminal 
cases: al-Marghinani, 1982: 353; Malik, 1989: 297. 
3. See: Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 2005 s 31; The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, GA Res 217A(III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess, 183rd plen mtg, [7], UN Doc A/810/71 (1948); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 14 
(entered into force 23 March 1976). The Special Rapporteur on Sudan, in his 1994 report to the Commission 
on Human Rights, said of a similarly worded provision in the Personal Matters Act for Muslims 1991 that 
‘[t]he Special Rapporteur cannot interpret this provision at this stage other than as meaning that the testimony 
of a woman is not equal to that of a man’: Biro, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1994/48 (1994), above n 57, [102]. 
4. See: Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 2005 s 31. 
5. See: Evidence Act 1993 s 62. 
6. The term hadd is the singular of hudud, which means the liabilities incurred as a result of crossing the 
boundaries set by God. 
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must produce four adult male witnesses to establish her lack of consent.1 The 
result is that for women who fall pregnant outside marriage, a finding of 
adultery is almost inevitable, while at the same time, there is virtual impunity 
for male perpetrators of rape. The discriminatory provisions in the Criminal 
Act 1991 and the Evidence Act 1993 are of critical importance in creating and 
sustaining an environment in which women are accorded a status subordinate 
to that of men, and must live with the knowledge that there is little likelihood 
of redress for sexual violence committed against them. 
The other significant piece of legislation in Sudan which violates the 
international legal doctrine of equality between men and women, and that 
contributes to a social, cultural and legal environment in which domestic 
violence is condoned, is the Muslim Personal Matters Act 1991 (‘Personal 
Matters Act’). In accordance with sharia law, the Personal Matters Act 
provides that a wife should take care of and obey her husband,2 and that in 
return she is entitled to maintenance, to be ‘treated tenderly’ and to ‘visit her 
parents and those relatives whom she is prohibited to marry’. (Personal 
Matters Act for Muslims 1991 s 51) Notably absent from this enumeration of 
rights are the right to work and the right to freedom of movement, including to 
leave the family home for reasons other than visiting her immediate family. 
Art 51 states that a wife does not deserve maintenance if, inter alia, she works 
outside the home without her husband’s approval unless ‘the husband’s 
disapproval is coercive’. (Personal Matters Act for Muslims 1991 s 51) The 
differentiation between a man and a woman’s rights and duties in marriage 
manifestly violates the principle of equality enshrined in the ICCPR, the 
ICESCR and the Constitution of Sudan,3 as well as the requirement in art 23(4) 
of the ICCPR that states must ‘take appropriate steps to ensure equality of 
rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution’.4 The restriction on a woman’s ability to work without her husband’s 
 
1. See: The Evidence Act 1993 does not specify the number of witnesses required to prove the crime of rape. 
However, the crime of rape is defined (Criminal Act 1991 s 149(1)) in the following terms: ‘there shall be 
deemed to commit the offence of rape, whoever makes sexual intercourse, by way of adultery, or sodomy, 
with any person without his consent’ (emphasis added). Thus, in order to prove the crime of rape, technically 
one must first prove adultery - requiring four male witnesses - and then prove lack of consent. 
2. See: Personal Matters Act for Muslims 1991 s 52. 
3. See: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171, art 3 (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 3, art 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976); 
Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 2005, s 32. 
4. See: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171, art 23(4) (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
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approval also violates art six of the ICESCR, which obligates Sudan to ensure 
the progressive realization of the right of everyone to ‘gain his [sic] living by 
work which he or she freely chooses or accepts’.1 The Personal Matters Act 
plays an important role in formalizing and legitimating the hierarchical relationship 
between husband and wife, and this contributes in turn to an understanding that 
disciplinary measures, including the possibility of violence, may be imposed 
when the relationship is challenged. More broadly, the restrictions on economic, 
social and cultural rights significantly impede women’s ability to access 
economic and social resources, and thus to fully participate in public and 
private life.2 The implications of these restrictions for development and for 
peace are discussed in the following sections. 
5. The Status of Women in States Applying Sharia Law: Manifestations 
of Inequality 
Sharia law is not a positive law in the sense of a body of legislation, but rather, 
provides a social, cultural and legal framework –drawn from the Qur’an and 
the sunna of the Prophet– that prescribes the rights and responsibilities of men 
and women in almost every aspect of daily life. Across the Islamic world, 
sharia law is incorporated into the domestic legal systems of states in a number 
of different ways. At the most purely Islamic end of the spectrum is Saudi 
Arabia, the constitution of which provides that “God’s book and the Sunnah of 
his Prophet (God’s prayers and peace be upon him) are its constitution”. 
(Constitution of Saudi Arabia 1992 s 1) The constitution of Iran, in slightly 
different terms, provides that all laws must be based on Islamic criteria.3 More 
commonly, the constitutions of a number of states including Bahrain, Egypt, 
Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen stipulate 
that ‘the Islamic sharia’ law or ‘Islamic jurisprudence’ is the main or the primary 
source of state legislation.4 The constitutions of Sudan (as has been shown), 
the Maldives and Afghanistan also identify sharia as one of the sources of law, 
albeit not necessarily the primary source.5 A number of other states, including 
 
1. See: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 3, art 6 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
2. See: Sullivan, 1991: 795, 839. 
3. See: Constitution of Iran 1979, article 4. 
4. See: Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain 2002 s 2; Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1980 s 2; 
Constitution of Kuwait 1962 s 2; The White Book: The Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman 1996 s 2; 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 s 2; Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar 2003 
s 2; Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic 1973 s 2; Constitution of the Republic of Yemen 1994 s 3. 
5. See: Constitution of Sudan 1998 s 65; Constitution of the Republic of Maldives 2008 s 10; Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004 s 2. 
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Libya, Gambia and Jordan, have hybrid legal systems – their constitutions 
stipulating that sharia courts will have jurisdiction over specified matters such 
as divorce, marriage, child custody and inheritance.1 
One of the commonalities across almost all states that have reflected sharia 
even partially in their legal systems is the extent to which the principles of 
sharia law regulate marriage and family life. The importance of sharia law in 
this area, and the recognition of its potential incompatibility with international 
law norms of equality and non-discrimination, is reflected in the reservations 
entered by states to art 16 of CEDAW concerning the equality of men and 
women in all matters relating to marriage and family life.2 Almost all of the 
Islamic states that have ratified CEDAW have entered reservations to art 16, 
most explaining in the text of their reservations that art 16 will not be observed 
insofar as is it incompatible with the Islamic Sharia.3 
Where sharia law is reflected in national legal systems, the restrictions on 
women’s ability to exercise economic, social and cultural rights, and associated 
norms of inequality and violence, are manifested in two important ways that 
have implications for development and –as will be discussed in the following 
section– for peace. 
At the most basic level, a constant threat of violence, coupled with an 
understanding of the impunity that exists for the perpetrators of violence, is 
profoundly disempowering for the victims of violence and for those at risk of 
violence. Many women whose lives have been regulated by traditional 
interpretations of sharia law have been taught from childhood and throughout 
marriage that from time to time others –even those they love– will subject them 
to violence. They have been taught that challenging the established order 
within the family may properly result in violence that in the event of an 
unwanted pregnancy they may be accused of adultery, and that if they seek 
legal redress for sexual violence there can almost never be sufficient evidence 
to support their story. Thus disempowered and living in a climate of fear, many 
women are prevented from attaining a basically acceptable quality of life and 
are unable to either contribute to or benefit from development. It has thus been 
 
1. See: Constitution of Libya 1969 s 8; Constitution of The Second Republic of the Gambia 1996 s 7; Constitution 
of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 1952 s 105. 
2. See: Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 18 December 
1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force on 3 September 1981) art 16. 
3. See: UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘Declarations, 
Reservations and Objections to CEDAW’ <http://un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country. 
htm> at 7 January 2008. 
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recognised by UNESCAP that ‘gender based violence is one of the greatest 
blocks to development worldwide’.1 
The second way in which Islamic law norms of inequality are manifested, as 
has been shown in the case of Sudan, is through personal status laws that 
entrench patriarchal gender relations and prevent women from exercising 
economic, social and cultural rights. Restrictions on women’s ability to 
participate freely and productively in society have been shown to manifest in 
high fertility rates, low literacy, high maternal mortality and limited labour 
force participation.2 The causal relationship between the application of Islamic 
personal status laws and the status of women has been explored by feminist 
scholar Valentine Moghadam, who observes that personal status laws 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa region generally accord women 
the legal status of a minor, subordinate to men in the areas of marriage, divorce, 
child custody and inheritance. Moghadam notes that personal status laws 
sustain a social order whereby the male has ‘direct access to wage employment 
or control over the means of production’ and the female is ‘largely 
economically dependent on male members of her family’, (Moghadam, 2005: 
107) and that this entrenchment of structural inequality is a critical factor in 
explaining the region’s “high (though declining) fertility rates, gender gaps in 
literacy, limited access for women in paid employment, and under-representation 
[of women] in the political system”. (Moghadam, 2005: 105) 
Another way in which the relationship between sharia law and gender equality 
can be observed is to consider the gender-related development indicators 
(GDIs) in the UN Development Program’s annual Human Development 
Reports. The GDIs measure achievement in the same basic capabilities as do 
the Human Development Indicators (HDIs) -life expectancy, educational 
attainment and income- but impose a penalty for inequality between women 
and men, such that the GDI falls either when the achievement levels of women 
and men in a country decrease simultaneously or when the disparity between 
their achievements increases.3 A country’s HDI rank minus its GDI rank shows 
the discrepancy between that country’s ranking on general development 
indicators, and its ranking where those same indicators are adjusted to take 
 
1. See: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia Pacific, ‘Report of The Sub-Regional 
Training Workshop On Elimination Of Violence Against Women In Partnership With Men’ (2-5 December 
2003) 2-3. 
2. See: Moghadam, 2005: 98-100. 
3. See: United Nations Development Program, 'Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate 
Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World' (2008) 358. 
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account of gender equality. The greater the disparity between men and women 
in basic capabilities, the greater the discrepancy between a country’s GDI as 
compared to its HDI. 
Of all 157 states for which statistics are provided in 2007/2008 report, the 
states with the greatest discrepancy between HDI and GDI rankings are Oman 
and Saudi Arabia, each with a discrepancy of -13, meaning that these states fall 
13 ranks lower on the development index once their rankings are adjusted to 
take gender inequality into account. The average discrepancy for states that 
explicitly recognise sharia as the primary source of legislation is -3.9.1 If the 
selection is expanded to include states whose constitutions recognise the 
jurisdiction of sharia courts over specified matters (Afghanistan, Brunei, 
Libya, Gambia, Jordan and Malaysia), the average discrepancy between HDI 
and the GDI rank falls to -3.6.2 
To sum up, then: social, legal and cultural norms which restrict women’s 
ability to exercise basic human rights, support violence as an appropriate 
response when the norms are violated, and restrict women’s ability to seek 
legal redress in response to violence, are fundamentally disempowering and as 
such limit women’s ability to contribute to or benefit from development. 
Personal status laws, in particular, formalize and sustain patriarchal gender 
relations, and the application of these laws is manifested in significant 
inequalities in the basic capabilities of women and men. The disempowerment 
of women, coupled with significant gender disparities in basic capabilities, 
have significant implications not only for development but for the achievement 
of sustainable peace. 
6. Violence against Women and Gender Inequality as a Threat to Peace 
The link between gender equality and gender based violence, development and 
peace has been increasingly recognized in conflict and development literature.3 
As stated by the Executive Director of the UN Population Fund in the open 
debate on Security Council Resolution 1325 (2004) on Women, Peace and 
Security, ‘if women and girls, and communities as a whole, are threatened by 
 
1. See: United Nations Development Program, 'Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate 
Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World' (2008) 
2. See: United Nations Development Program, 'Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate 
Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World' (2008) 
3. See, for eg, Warriner and Tessler, 1997: 250;  Caprioli, 2003; Caprioli, 2005: 49; Caprioli, 2001: 503; Caprioli, 
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gender-based violence, then there is no real chance for peace and security’.1 
Four years later the Security Council passed Resolution 1820 on Women, 
Peace and Security, stressing ‘the importance of [women’s] equal participation 
and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace 
and security’, and acknowledging that the ‘persistent obstacles and challenges to 
women’s participation and full involvement in the prevention and resolution of 
conflicts’ has a ‘negative impact … on durable peace, security and reconciliation’.2 
In explaining the relationship between gender equality, freedom from violence 
and peace, two alternative approaches have been put forward. The first demonstrates 
that violence and inequality contribute indirectly to the likelihood of conflict 
by constraining a state’s ability to pursue economic development and good 
governance. The second approach argues that violence and inequality between 
men and women reflect cultural norms of hierarchy, domination and the use of 
force, and that the existence of these norms increases the likelihood of a state’s 
engagement in both internal and external conflict. These two approaches will 
be discussed in turn. 
6.1. Gender Equality and Development; Development and Peace 
Gender inequalities, as has been shown above, have an enormous toll on the 
quality of women’s lives. In addition to the significant personal costs, gender 
inequalities restrict women’s ability to earn income, access resources and be 
productive, and this not only constrains the ability of women to influence 
resource allocation and investment decisions in the home, but constrains a 
state’s ability to reduce poverty, raise living standards and ensure economic 
progress.3 Gender equality also has important public health implications: 
poorly educated mothers are less likely to provide appropriate care for their 
children, and this results in higher infant and child mortality and malnutrition.4 
Gender equality has been shown also to improve a country’s governance, 
because ‘where the influence of women in public life is greater, the level of 
corruption is lower’.5 Better governance means more effective development 
policies.6 In a 2005 study on gender and development, the World Bank noted 
 
1. Thoyara Ahmed Obaid, 'Women, Peace and Security, Responding to the Needs to Victims of Gender Based 
Violence' (Statement, UN SC Open Debate on SC Res 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, 2004) 
<http://www.unfpa.org/news/news.cfm?ID=523> at 7 January 2009. 
2. Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, SC Res 1820, UN SCOR, 5916th mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1820 (2008). 
3. See: World Bank, Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice, 2001: 5. 
4. See: World Bank, Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice, 2001: 8. 
5. See: World Bank, Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice, 2001: 11. 
6. See: World Bank, Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice, 2001: 8. 
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that while ‘identifying and measuring the full extent of [the costs of gender 
inequalities] is difficult, … a wealth of evidence from countries around the 
world demonstrates that societies with large, persistent gender inequalities pay 
the price of more poverty, malnutrition, illness and other deprivations’.1 The 
report concluded that gender equality is a ‘development objective in its own 
right’ in that it ‘strengthens countries ability to grow, to reduce poverty, and to 
govern effectively’.2 
The causal effect between economic development and peace has been well 
established in civil war literature.3 Hegre and Sambanis, in their 2006 analysis 
of factors that potentially increase the likelihood of civil war, note that the ‘key 
variables in economic theories – per capita income and, to a lesser extent, the 
rate of growth of income – are very robust’. (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006: 533) 
Their research shows GDP per capita to be ‘robustly significant’, with a 1% 
increase in income reducing the risk of civil war onset by 0.5%.4 The finding 
is consistent with a significant body of literature supporting the relationship 
between economic development and civil war.5 If it is well established that 
reducing disparities between women and men promotes development, and that 
development is one of the most significant factors determining the likelihood 
of peace, it may equally be said that gender equality is a significant contributor 
–albeit indirectly– to peace. As stated by the UN Economic, Social and 
Cultural Organisation at the Fourth World Conference on Women, ‘there can 
be no lasting peace without development, and no sustainable development 
without full equality between men and women’.6 
6.2. Gender Equality as a Direct Contributor to Peace 
More directly, a number of studies have highlighted the role of domestic gender 
inequality as an important predictor of both internal and external conflict. 
Professor Mary Caprioli, for example, explains the correlation between gender 
inequality and conflict as stemming from the fact that gender inequality is a 
manifestation of both structural inequality and structural violence.7 ‘Structural 
 
1. See: World Bank, Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice, 2001: 8. 
2. See: World Bank, Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice, 2001: 1. 
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4. See: Hegre and Sambanis, 2006: 524. 
5. See: Hegre and Sambanis, 2006: 532. 
6. See:UN Economic, Social and Cultural Organisation, 'Statement on Women's Contribution to a Culture of 
Peace' (Statement presented to the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing 1995) <http://www.unesco.org/ 
cpp/uk/declarations/wcpbei.htm> at 11 January 2008. 
7. See: Caprioli, ‘Gender Equality and Civil Wars’, 2003: 72-5. 
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inequality’ refers to the structural system of male domination/female subordination, 
created and sustained by religious, cultural or social norms of hierarchy and 
domination. Acceptance of these norms, coupled with an enduring threat of 
violence and often a lack of legal redress (as has been shown above), ensures 
acquiescence to structural inequality.1 Structural inequality that subordinates 
women leads to gendered structural violence - an environment that supports and 
legitimizes violence against women.2 
Where religious, social and cultural norms support relations of subordination 
and domination, and legitimize violence as a means of addressing grievance, 
this results in an increased societal tolerance of violence, which translates in 
turn to increased political violence. As stated by Caprioli, 
when societal tolerance of violence is supported and legitimised by 
an environment of structural violence, the incidence of both inter 
and intrastrate violence should increase, for violence becomes the 
way of life and a valid tool for settling disputes. (Caprioli, ‘Primed 
for Violence’, 2003: 72) 
Norms of equality, on the other hand, evidence an absence of oppression and 
violence, and facilitate ‘cooperation among groups who are then more likely 
to rely on influence and persuasion, rather than on violence’. (Caprioli, 
‘Gender Equality and Civil Wars’, 2003: 72-5) In a study of intrastate disputes 
between 1960 and 2001, Caprioli found that states with high fertility rates (a 
measure of inequality, discrimination and structural violence3) were nearly 
twice as likely to experience intrastate conflict as states with low fertility rates. 
Caprioli’s other measure of gender equality, female participation in the labour 
force, was also found to be statistically significant, with ‘states with 10% 
women in the labour force nearly 30 times more likely to experience internal 
conflict than states with 40% women in the labour force’. (Caprioli, ‘Primed 
for Violence’, 2003: 72, 172) Caprioli concludes that ‘the higher the level of 
gender inequality within a state, the greater the likelihood such a state will 
experience internal conflict’.(Caprioli, ‘Primed for Violence’, 2003: 72-172) 
7. Conclusion 
Inequality and violence against women is prevalent not just in Islamic 
 
1. See: Caprioli, ‘Gender Equality and Civil Wars’, 2003: 72. 4-6. 
2. See: Caprioli, ‘Gender Equality and Civil Wars’, 2003: 72. 4-6. 
3. See: Caprioli, ‘Gender Equality and Civil Wars’, 2003: 72, 17. 
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societies, but throughout the world; in no region in the developing world are 
women equal to men in legal, social and economic rights.1 There are myriad 
reasons for the prevalence of inequality and violence, and this paper does not 
purport to suggest that the existence of sharia law is the only, or even the 
primary, cause. It is clear, however, that the messages conveyed by sharia 
regarding gender relations, and the actions of governments in incorporating 
sharia into state legislation, are powerful forces in the entrenchment of 
inequality and violence throughout the Islamic world. Inequality and violence, 
as has been shown above, prevent women from contributing to and benefiting 
from development, inhibit a country’s ability to ensure economic progress, and 
increase the likelihood of inter and intrastate conflict. 
Islamic states, as well as all other states whose legal systems do not ensure 
equality of men and women before the law and equal protection by the law, 
must be encouraged to bring their domestic legislation into line with international 
human rights instruments to which the state is party, and with the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination enshrined in customary international law. 
Personal status legislation (and in the case of Sudan, the Criminal Act 1991, 
the Evidence Act 1993 and the Personal Matters Act 1991) must be addressed 
as priorities. States that have not yet ratified CEDAW and/or its Optional 
Protocol should be encouraged to do so, and should be encouraged to do so 
without entering reservations that contradict the very purpose and spirit of the 
Convention. States that have entered such reservations, in particular to art 16 
concerning equality in marriage and family life, should be encouraged to 
withdraw these reservations in light of their obligations under customary 
international law. States that have not already done so should be encouraged to 
adopt domestic violence legislation.2 Until state legislation and practice is brought 
into line with standards in international human rights law, particularly as regards 
the equal rights of women in marriage and in family life, violence will continue 
to be a part of women’s lives, women will be restricted from exercising the 
basic human rights to which they are entitled, and countries will be constrained 
in their progress towards development and ultimately towards peace.  
 
1. See: World Bank, above n 75, 1. 
2. See: The UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing called upon governments to ‘enact and/or 
reinforce penal, civil, labour and administrative sanctions in domestic legislation to punish and redress the 
wrongs done to women and girls who are subjected to any form of violence, whether in the home, the 
workplace, the community or society’: Beijing Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, 
[125], UN Doc A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995). 
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